A much-related evolution has

been a marked transition in inshore management regimes from de facto

community-based property rights to open access and then regulated open access. Indeed, some decades ago, the exploitation of most coastal fisheries was often

subject to some degree of community-based regulations with a strong sense of

community ownership and, to a lesser extent, of management responsibility. In

other words, the modes of production and the nature of the activity have evolved

and so has the context of fisheries management (Christy, 1996). Finally, while recognizing the inherent difficulty of

effectively controlling vessel capacity, one may wonder if the relatively poor

performance of most limited entry schemes is not predominantly due to the lack

of real commitment to effective control.

Should that occur, one could anticipate that the vessel owners

themselves would engage in intra-industry buy backs, in order to enhance their

joint profits from the fisheries. That still leaves the question, of course, as

to what would happen to the vessels removed from the fishery, or

fisheries. In addition to the OECD survey, we have an extensive survey of

limited entry programmes that was undertaken a few years earlier by Ralph

Townsend (Townsend, 1990).

Examples of Overcapitalization (With Excel Template)

From the

perspective of the DWFNs, the displaced fleets (and crews) constituted capital

that was distinctly non-malleable with respect to fishing activities. One difference between our assessment, and that of the OECD,

is that we are insistent upon including taxes, or their equivalent, among the

incentive adjusting measures. We do so in recognition of the fact that there is

evidence that taxes can be effectively applied in some countries, especially if

some kind of exclusivity is recognized. While incentive adjusting methods appear

more promising for the control of capacity, there is also evidence that these

schemes, are not readily applicable to many fisheries or countries. But there is also ample

evidence that schemes such as ITQs are not readily applicable to many fisheries

and infeasible in most developing countries. First, in order to apply taxes precisely, one has to be prepared to adjust

them continuously, due to continual shifts in resource and economic conditions.

The purpose of TACs obviously is to block fishermen in their

attempt to overexploit the resource. The OECD argues that, if TACs are

introduced to a hitherto pure open access fishery, the TAC, if it is going to do

any good, must be set below the original harvest level. The OECD predicts that

the reduced harvest level, arising from a TACs-only policy, can be expected to

force out some of the marginal vessels, because they will not be covering all of

their fixed costs.

overcapitalized

The other category consists of those

fishery resources which are to be found both within the coastal state EEZ and

the adjacent high seas. Outside of supporting attempts to gain access to new

fisheries, the governments supporting DWFN fleets would, in light of the severe

adjustment problems that they were confronting with these fleets, be under

strong pressure to cushion the blow through subsidies. The Milazzo study does,

for example, observe that the main effect of the Japanese subsidy programme,

which is substantial, has been to cause the decline in the Japanese fishing

fleet to be less precipitous than would otherwise have been the case. It should be noted in passing, that the DWFNs would have no

incentive to conserve the high seas resources they were now seeking to exploit. These fisheries were, after all, virtually text book examples of pure open

access fisheries.

There is indeed ample evidence that

most schemes have been implemented until recently against a sectoral policy

background of laissez-faire and of prompt compromise on socially or politically

sensitive aspects of any schemes. In North America, for example, the large

number of underutilized or inactive permits attests to rather generous initial

allocations and is now making it quite complex to implement license retirement

programmes. In more general terms, many limited entry programmes were actually

initiated against a policy framework of intensive subsidization for vessel

construction and improvement. One may also point out that limited entry schemes

have in the past seldom been implemented in partnership with the

industry, a sine qua non condition for success in our opinion.

the management of fishing capacity

In some countries and in relation to the relative dynamism of

processors and traders, growing export possibilities have constituted a definite

opportunity for this sector to develop and modernize. In others, the small-scale

sector has been marginalized or relegated to supplying the less lucrative local

market. In general, the globalisation of the market has strengthened the role of

processors and traders vis à vis independent fishermen. One further

observes that increased dependency on global markets is occurring in a context

of relatively stagnant world supply and raising prices, even if aquaculture

production continues to rise. In this part, we discuss four selected issues of direct

relevance to the overcapitalization problem or the control of fishing capacity

in general. These are subsidies, the framework of fishing capacity management,

the distribution of wealth, and transboundary resources.

• Companies may also find themselves at risk of becoming overcapitalized when they either mismanage or underutilize the capital they have at their disposal.
• Vessel catch limits restrict the amount that a vessel can

  land, either on a per-trip basis, or on a per period of time basis, e.g. per

  day, week, or month.

• The

  example focuses upon the famous Northern Cod resource off Atlantic

  Canada.

• When Canada implemented Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ)

  in 1977, 95 percent of the Northern Cod resource became subject to Canadian

  control and management.

• It is now

  recognized that, if nations that are jointly engaged in the exploitation of a

  fishery resource refuse to cooperate, the outcome will be similar to a domestic

  fishery operating under conditions of “pure” open access.

The tendency will be

particularly strong if TACs are combined with the effort quotas. It is interesting that, in both instances, measures which

individually are incentive blocking in nature, when combined, act to some degree

like incentive-altering measures. The OECD report does complain that the

combinations are less efficient than true IQs, particularly the transferable

variety. Be that as it may, given that the efficacy of IQs is not without

limits, particularly in developing countries, the “second best”

combinations remain worthy of serious consideration. Following this, a moratorium is then declared on the issuance of

further new licenses.

Why is it important to know about overcapitalization?

The consequences, in terms of making a bad situation worse, are too

obvious to have to be spelled out (McKelvey, 1984; 1987). The implication of the assumption is that one can turn the

“conventional” capital on and off like a tap. There would be no

worry about redundant capital emerging, because in these circumstances, no sane

fisherman would retain redundant vessel capital.

The obvious points were made

that subsides can aggravate the problem of overcapitalization, and that the

evidence indicates that they do just that, probably on a massive scale. We now

want to return to consider subsidies in light of our discussion of the economics

of overcapitalization and possible methods of control. In so doing, we shall

draw heavily on a recent, and thorough, study of subsidies in fisheries carried

out by Matteo Milazzo, National Marine Fisheries Service (U.S.A.) (1996).

We take two examples, the first being an

investigation of alternative stock rebuilding programmes for the Georges Bank

cod stock, off New England, as set forth in an article by Andrew Rosenberg and

Solange Brault (1991). Repayment of long-term debts to reduce the interest payments may help an overcapitalized firm to relieve the problem. Acquisition of unproductive assets or buying them at inflated prices may also result in the overcapitalization of a company. In the same way, an overcapitalized company suffers from various adverse effects. Higher taxation rates may consume a large portion of earnings and, in this way, deprive shareholders of a dividend at a fair rate. Therefore, if excessive funds have been allocated to the acquisition of goodwill, a lower amount of funds will be available for use.

Indeed, property rights have the potential to

radically alter the nature of participation in fisheries, raising fear that big

business will take over fisheries – even in the USA (Greer, 1995). As shown in the countries that have undertaken extensive

transferable licence schemes and ITQ programmes, some concentration and

reallocation among user groups 5 skills every entrepreneur should have have indeed occurred under these schemes. It may

only be assumed that ‘group-based’ property rights regimes could lead

to a better control of such evolution in the sense that broader considerations

could be internalized. Moreover, there is also a tendency towards increasingly long term

ITQs, e.g. in New Zealand, where they are permanent in term.